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European Union Citizenship - The Pitfalls of a Fundamental Status 
 
European Union citizenship was introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 and is currently 
held by approximately 500 million people. In 2001, the European Court of Justice (hereinafter: 
ECJ or Court) famously held in Grzelczyk that “Union citizenship is destined to be the 
fundamental status of nationals of the Member States”.1 This article aims to contribute to the 
ongoing debate regarding the shift in the Court’s case law on EU citizenship,2 by exploring 
whether EU citizenship can still be considered as the fundamental status of every citizen of the 
European Union or whether some EU citizens are excluded from this status and the rights 
associated therewith. This question is discussed against the background of the inherently open 
notion of integration and against two principles of the Rechtsstaat, one being the principle of 
legal certainty and the other being the principle of proportionality. The notion of integration and 
the principle of proportionality share common features as they are open-ended, require an 
assessment of the facts of the individual case and are therefore not conducive to establishing 
legal certainty. 
This article addresses the Court’s recourse to the respective concepts and the effects of the 
application of these concepts on EU citizenship. It is argued that the Court’s recourse to the 
principle of legal certainty is used to forego a proportionality assessment. The lack of a 
proportionality assessment and thereby a lack of an assessment of the facts of the individual 
case and a balancing process, disadvantages specific groups of EU citizens. In other areas of 
citizenship law, the Court establishes the requirement of an assessment of the EU citizen’s 
integration in the host Member State. This approach, however, has the effect of undermining 
legal certainty and furthers the exclusion of EU citizens from the protection against expulsion 
or the acquisition of permanent residence status. The ECJ’s recourse to the principle of legal 
certainty or the concept of integration enhances Member States’ sovereignty, their margin of 
discretion vis-à-vis EU citizens and weakens the legal position of EU citizens.  
 
 
                                                          
1 Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk, EU:C:2001:458, para. 31. Similarly Recital 3 of the Preamble to the Citizenship Di-
rective provides: “Union citizenship should be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States when 
they exercise their right of free movement and residence”. 
2 See specifically, N. Nic Shuibhne, “Limits rising, duties ascending: The changing legal shape of Union citizen-
ship”, 52 CMLRev. (2015), pp. 889; D. Thym “The Elusive Limits of Solidarity: Residence Rights of and Social Ben-
efits for Economically Inactive Union Citizens”, 52 CMLRev. (2015), pp. 17; E. Spaventa, “Earned Citizenship – 
Understanding EU Citizenship through Its Scope”, in: D. Kochenov (ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism, The 




Shortly after the introduction of EU citizenship in 1992, the European Court of Justice 
(hereinafter: ECJ or Court) breathed life into this concept and became the driving force behind 
its development. In the late 1990s and at the beginning of the millennium, the ECJ steadily 
increased and strengthened the rights of EU citizens and their family members, often with 
recourse to the principle of equal treatment stipulated in Article 18 TFEU. In this so-called 
‘constituent phase’,3 the Court often gave a broad interpretation of the rights granted to EU 
citizens while interpreting the limits of the rights restrictively. 
EU citizenship has enabled its holders to rely on equal treatment with nationals of the 
respective state, for example when asking for child raising allowance (Martínez Sala),4 
subsistence allowance (Grzelczyk)5 or social assistance (Trojani).6 These, as well as other 
judgments, were considered to detach EU citizenship from its market logic,7 and were held to 
stress the “aspirational vocation of equal citizenship”.8 Principles that were established in the 
initial phase of citizenship case law were subsequently codified in Directive 2004/38 
(hereinafter: the Citizenship Directive),9 which marked the phase of consolidation.10 In this 
phase, the Court refined previously established principles and developed new strands of its 
citizenship case law. According to Iliopoulou-Penot, the Court’s focus rested more on the social 
integration of EU citizens rather than on their productivity and contribution to the prosperity of 
the host society.11  
Considering the continuous strengthening of EU citizens’ rights and the aim of an ever-closer 
Union among the peoples of Europe,12 one might have expected a further enhancement of the 
rights of EU citizens. However, in recent years the opposite direction seems to prevail and the 
                                                          
3 E. Spaventa (Fn. 2), p. 207. 
4 Case C-85/96, Martínez Sala, EU:C:1998:217. Here, it was held that a Spanish citizen’s claim for child raising 
allowance could not be refused by the German authorities on the basis of the lack of a residence permit, as 
German nationals did not have to fulfil this requirement to be eligible for the allowance.  
5 Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk, EU:C:2001:458. 
6 Case C-456/02, Trojani, EU:C:2004:488.  
7 F. Strumia, “Looking for Substance at the Boundaries: European Citizenship and Mutual Recognition of Be-
longing”, 32(1) Yearbook of European Law (2013), p. 459. 
8 D. Thym, “Frontiers of EU Citizenship: Three Trajectories and Their Methodological Limitations”, in: D. 
Kochenov (ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism, The Role of Rights, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2017, pp. 717-719. 
9 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the right of citizens of the Union and 
their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation 
(EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 
75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC, O.J. 30.04.2004, L 158, p. 77 (hereinafter the ‘Citizenship 
Directive’). 
10 E. Spaventa (Fn.2), p. 208. 
11 A. Iliopoulou-Penot, “Deconstructing the former edifice of Union citizenship? The Alimanovic judgment”, 53 
CMLRev. (2016), p. 1021. 
12 Preamble to the Treaty on European Union. 
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fundamental status of Union citizenship seems to be fading away, especially for those who are 
economically inactive or not sufficiently economically active, who lack sufficient financial 
resources or do not comply with the (criminal) laws of the host Member State. Spaventa 
describes the Court’s more recent approach to EU citizenship as a “reactionary phase”13 and 
Thym observes that the case law exhibits a “doctrinal conservatism”.14 He argues that the 
“promise of equality does not embrace all those holding the status”.15  
However, it should be noted from the outset that the aforementioned Grzelczyk formula always 
had two components. The full paragraph of the Court’s judgment reads: “Union citizenship is 
destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those who 
find themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of their 
nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for”.16 While the first two 
phases of the ECJ’s case law on citizenship seem to embody the first part of the formula, the 
current phase reflects the second part of the formula by focusing more on the limitations. These 
limitations and exceptions to the right to move and reside freely are also provided for in Article 
21 TFEU, but the Court has repeatedly clarified that “those limitations and conditions must be 
applied in compliance with the limits imposed by Community law and in accordance with the 
general principles of that law, in particular the principle of proportionality”.17 
The first part (1.) of this article sets the scene by providing a brief overview of the different 
directions the Court’s case law on EU citizenship has taken in the last couple of years. The 
second part (2.) addresses the Court’s case law regarding EU citizens’ access to non-
contributory cash benefits and analyses the noticeable jurisprudential shift undertaken by the 
Court. The difference in the judgments regarding social benefits is characterised by an 
increasing reliance on the principle of legal certainty, which provides the Court with a 
justification for departing from the principle of proportionality. While the principle of 
proportionality, which involves a balancing of the conflicting interests, is not conducive to legal 
certainty as the outcome of the balancing process is not predictable, it is nevertheless a 
general principle of Union law and must be respected by the Unions’ institutions. The shift from 
the principle of proportionality to the principle of legal certainty has the effect of excluding 
certain EU citizens from access to social benefits. The third part (3.) briefly explores the right 
of residence of third-country family members upon return to the EU citizen’s home Member 
State. This part exhibits parallels to the second part as it seems to be governed by a similar 
approach in that the Court has relied – implicitly – on legal certainty and abstained from 
                                                          
13 E. Spaventa (Fn. 2), pp. 208, 209. 
14 D. Thym, “When Union citizens turn into illegal migrants: the Dano case”, 40 E.L. Rev. (2015), p. 252. 
15 Ibid., p. 261. 
16 Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk, EU:C:2001:458, para. 31. 
17 Case C-413/99, Baumbast and R., EU:C:2002:493, para. 91; Case C-456/02, Trojani, EU:C:2004:488, para. 34.  
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conducting a proportionality assessment. In the fourth part (4.), the notion of integration is 
briefly introduced and two different functions that can be assigned to this concept will be 
highlighted. The fifth part (5.) outlines the case law regarding the acquisition of the right of 
permanent residence and critically assesses the Court’s recourse to the notion of integration. 
The Court has linked the acquisition of the right of permanent residence to the notion of 
integration and has turned integration into a requirement that the foreigner must fulfil. It is 
argued that this not only militates against the function attached to the notion of integration in 
the context of the Preamble of the Citizenship Directive, but that it also excludes certain EU 
citizens from acquiring the right of permanent residence. The sixth part (6.) focuses on EU 
citizens’ protection against expulsion which is similar to the approach adopted by the Court 
that was outlines in the fifth part as it relies on the notion of integration, which the Court argues 
underpins the protection against expulsion. Finally, the effects of the Court’s recourse to the 
notion of integration, the principle of proportionality and the principle of legal certainty on EU 
citizenship are summarised in the concluding remarks (II.) 
 
1. Different directions of the Court’s case law on EU citizenship 
The different phases outlined in the introduction (I.), serve only as indications and must not 
hide the fact that the Court’s case law on EU citizenship is neither homogeneous nor linear18 
and that the Court does not hold a uniform concept of EU citizenship.19 It rather reflects a 
dialogue between the ECJ and national courts20 whereby the Court invites national courts to 
initiate further debate by reacting to its judgments. The subsequent section shall briefly 
highlight selected judgments on EU citizenship in different areas and demonstrate that the 
Court does not follow a linear approach, but rather a combination of different approaches. 
The Tsakouridis judgment of November 2010 concerned an EU citizen’s protection 
against expulsion. Mr Tsakouridis had resided for more than ten years in Germany and could 
therefore only be expelled on imperative grounds of public security.21 The ECJ departed from 
its previous interpretation of public security,22 and adopted a wider definition of this notion.23 
By allowing for such a broad definition of public security, the Court increased the power of 
                                                          
18 P. Hilpold, “Die Unionsbürgerschaft – Entwicklung und Probleme”, EuR 2015, p. 135. 
19 D. Thym (Fn. 2), p. 33. 
20 See, T. Tridimas, “The ECJ and the National Courts, Dialogue, Cooperation and Instability”, in: D. Chalmers, A. 
Arnull (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 403.  
21 Article 28(3)(a) of the Citizenship Directive. 
22 Case C-367/89, Aimé Richardt and Les Accessoires Scientifiques SNC, EU:C:1991:376, para. 22; Case C-83/94, 
Leifer, C-83/94, EU:C:1995:329, para. 26; Case C-273/97, Sirdar, EU:C:1999:523, para. 17; Case C-423/98, 
Albore, EU:C:2000:401, para. 18; Case C-285/98, Kreil, EU:C:2000:2, para. 17, Case C-72/83, Campus Oil Limited, 
EU:C:1984:256, para. 34. 
23 Case C-145/09, Tsakouridis, EU:C:2010:708, para. 56. 
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Member States to remove EU citizens from their territory and weakened the latter’s potection 
against expulsion. The approach adopted in Tsakouridis was confirmed one year later in P.I.24 
Contrary to its limiting approach in Tsakouridis, the Court strengthened the rights of 
static minor EU citizens and their third-country carers in Ruiz Zambrano only four months later. 
The Ruiz Zambrano judgment confirmed the autonomous meaning of EU citizenship and 
created a third type of link for a situation to fall within the scope of EU law. Prior to Ruiz 
Zambrano a situation would have to display an inter-state element or be covered by EU 
legislation in order to fall within the scope of EU law. Tridimas argues that Ruiz Zambrano 
“mark(s) a departure (...) from the internal market model of European integration to a 
citizenship paradigm”.25 In Ruiz Zambrano the Court held “that Article 20 TFEU (…) precludes 
a Member State from refusing” a third-country national father of static EU citizens, whom are 
dependent on that third-county national, a right of residence and a work permit “in so far as 
such decisions deprive those children of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights 
attaching to the status of European Union citizen”.26 According to Tridimas, the Court’s use of 
the imprecise and abstract term of “genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights” invites 
national courts to initiate further debate through the preliminary reference procedure.27  
Only two months later, in May 2011, the Court elaborated on the notion of “genuine 
enjoyment of the substance of the rights” in McCarthy28 and – depending on one’s perspective 
– either retreated from or clarified the Ruiz Zambrano judgment. McCarthy concerned a dual 
British and Irish citizen who had always resided in the UK and whom wished to be joined by 
her spouse, whom was a third-country national. Given that “the national measure at issue (…) 
does not have the effect of obliging Mrs McCarthy to leave the territory of the European 
Union”29 she was held not to be deprived of the substance of her rights. Later in 2011, the 
approach adopted in McCarthy was confirmed in Dereci30 and in the subsequent years in other 
cases.31 According to Adam and van Elsuwege this restrictive interpretation of the ‘genuine 
enjoyment test’ aims to “avoid impinging upon Member States’ autonomy to regulate migration 
and to preserve the Union legislature’s choices in the Citizenship Directive”.32 Moreover, they 
                                                          
24 Case C-348/09, P.I., EU:C:2012:300. 
25 T. Tridimas (Fn. 20), pp. 410. 
26 Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano, EU:C:2011:124, para. 45. 
27 T. Tridimas (Fn. 20), pp. 409. 
28 Case C-434/09, McCarthy, EU:C:2011:277. 
29 Ibid., para. 50. 
30 Case C-256/11, Dereci, EU:C:2011:734. 
31 For example, Case C-40/11, Iida, EU:C:2012:691; Case C-356/11 and C-357/11, O, S v. Maahanmuuttovirasto, 
and Maahanmuuttovirasto v. L, EU:C:2012:776; Case C-87/12, Ymeraga, EU:C:2013:291. 
32 S. Adam and P. van Elsuwege, EU Citizenship and the European Federal Challenge through the Prism of Fam-
ily Reunification, in: D. Kochenov (ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism, The Role of Rights, Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press, 2017, p. 451. 
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point out that the use of generic references such as ‘genuine enjoyment’ or ‘the substance of 
rights’ clearly contributes to legal uncertainty.33 
Concerning EU citizens’ access to non-contributory cash benefits, the Court rejected 
any automatic denial of benefits in its Brey34 judgment of September 2013 and required that 
an assessment of the facts of the individual case and a proportionality assessment be 
conducted. In contrast to Brey, the Court weakened the position of EU citizens’ regarding 
access to non-contributory cash benefits in Dano35 (2014) and in Alimanovic36 (2015). Whilst 
the Court focused on a proportionality assessment in Brey, the Court eschewed conducting a 
proportionality assessment in Dano and subsequently justified the lack of a proportionality 
assessment by having recourse to the legal certainty principle in Alimanovic. This 
jurisprudential shift thereby allowed non-contributory cash benefits to be denied, without a 
proportionality assessment having to be conducted. 
Regarding EU citizens’ protection against expulsion, the Court undermined the 
protection of EU citizens even further in the M.G.37 case of January 2014, by linking the 
protection against expulsion provided for in the Citizenship Directive to an integration 
requirement. However, in Rendón Marín38 and CS39 of September 2016, the Court 
strengthened the rights of third-country nationals who are the primary carers of static, minor 
EU citizens who are dependent on the third-country national, by emphasising the importance 
of an assessment of the individual case and a proportionality assessment and by barring an 
automatic expulsion of the third-country national and the denial of a residence permit 
respectively. 
Strumia correctly states that there might be a risk “that supranational citizenship becomes the 
fundamental status for a shrinking subset of such people” and that the end result may be that 
more rights are given to fewer people.40 However, while she argues that the doctrine of the 
substance of the rights developed in Ruiz Zambrano is an “effort to also protect those who 
stand at its margins”,41 this article focuses on those EU citizens who stand at the margins due 
to their insufficient economic activity or their lack of compliance with criminal laws and whom 
the Court seems to exclude from some of the rights attached to EU citizenship.  
                                                          
33 D. Kochenov, “The Right to Have What Rights?”, 19 European Law Journal (2013), p. 512; S. Adam and P. van 
Elsuwege (Fn. 32), p. 452. 
34 Case C-140/12, Brey, EU:C:2013:565. 
35 Case C-333/13, Dano, EU:C:2014:2358. 
36 Case C-67/14, Alimanovic, EU:C:2015:597. 
37 Case C-400/12, M.G., EU:C:2014:9. 
38 Case C-165/14, Rendón Marín, EU:C:2016:675. 
39 Case C-304/14, CS, EU:C:2016:674. 





2. Access to non-contributory cash benefits 
This section addresses the right to equal treatment of EU citizens with nationals of the host 
Member State regarding access to non-contributory cash benefits. In Brey,42 the Court relied, 
in contrast to subsequent judgments, on the principle of proportionality. The case concerned  
a German pensioner’s application for a compensatory pension supplement, which was refused 
by the competent Austrian authorities on the grounds that Mr Brey did not have “sufficient 
resources to establish his lawful residence in Austria”.43 The Court recalled that “the right to 
freedom of movement is – as a fundamental principle of EU law – the general rule” and stated 
that “the conditions laid down in Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 2004/38”, which refers to a 
requirement of sufficient resources “must be construed narrowly (…) and in compliance with 
the limits imposed by EU law and the principle of proportionality (…)”.44  
The ECJ clarified that any automatism provided for by national law is prohibited by EU law45 
and that an assessment of the facts of the individual case and compliance with the principle of 
proportionality are crucial. Finally, the Court provided a non-exhaustive list of criteria that 
should be considered by the competent authorities when assessing an economically inactive 
EU citizen’s application for a benefit.46 
Even though the Court did not refer to the ‘fundamental status’ formula, it reiterated the 
notion of financial solidarity that it already mentioned in its 2001 Grzelczyk judgment by stating 
that “Directive 2004/38 thus recognises a certain degree of financial solidarity between 
nationals of a host Member State and nationals of other Member States, particularly if the 
difficulties which a beneficiary of the right of residence encounters are temporary”.47 
While the Court upheld the requirement of an assessment of the facts of the individual 
case48 and a proportionality assessment and thereby prohibited any automatism, the judgment 
is not as migrant-friendly as it might seem at first glance. O’Brien argues that the Court “closed 
off suggestions that EU nationals ought to have equal access (…) to special non-contributory 
                                                          
42 Case C-140/12, Brey, EU:C:2013:565. 
43 Ibid., para. 17. 
44 Ibid., para. 70. 
45 Ibid., para. 77. As to the problems of determining an unreasonable burden see, H. Verschueren, “Free Move-
ment or Benefit Tourism: The Unreasonable Burden of Brey”, 16 European Journal of Migration and Law 
(2014), p. 171, 172; M. Dawson and B. de Witte, “Welfare Policy and Social Inclusion”, in: D. Chalmers and A. 
Arnull (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 970; P. 
Minderhoud, “Directive 2004/38 and Access to Social Assistance Benefits”, in: E. Guild, C. Gortázar Rotaeche 
and D. Kostakopoulou (eds.), The Reconceptualization of European Union Citizenship, Brill, 2013, pp. 218, 219, 
223. 
46 Case C-140/12, Brey, EU:C:2013:565, para. 78. 
47 Case C-140/12, Brey, EU:C:2013:565, para. 72. 
48 Ibid., para. 64. 
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benefits (…) as part of the legislative compromise that shielded those benefits from 
exportation”.49 Moreover, she opines that Brey implies that Member States can “subordinate 
residence rights to the “legitimate interests” of protecting public finances”,50 an aspect that was 
certainly prominent in the subsequent Dano and Alimanovic judgments. Likewise, Davies 
highlights that the principles established in Brey are quite restrictive and do not threaten the 
public finances of the Member States.51 Nevertheless, in contrast to the subsequent 
judgments, which constitute a remarkable deviance in the Court’s approach, the 2013 Brey 
judgment strongly relies on the principle of proportionality. 
 
a. The Dano case 
The 2014 Dano judgment, by way of contrast, did not even mention the principle of 
proportionality. The case concerned the Romanian nationals Ms Dano and her son Florin, who 
had resided in Germany for several years.52 Ms Dano did not work or seek work, nor was she 
ever employed throughout the duration of her stay in Germany. She and her son applied for 
non-contributory cash benefits according to the German Social Code II (Sozialgesetzbuch II), 
which was subsequently refused by the German authorities.  
Even though the Court had recourse to the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of 
nationality,53 it did not base its reasoning on the equal treatment provision in primary law, but 
on secondary law by holding that “the principle of non-discrimination, laid down generally in 
Article 18 TFEU, is given more specific expression in Article 24 of Directive 2004/38”.54 In a 
second step, the Court emphasised that Article 24(1) of the Citizenship Directive “provides that 
all Union citizens residing on the basis of the directive in the territory of the host Member State 
are to enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of that Member State”55 and thereby made 
recourse to the right to equal treatment contingent on the fulfilment of the criteria laid down in 
secondary law.  In Ms Dano’s case, residence on the basis of that Directive meant compliance 
with the requirements of Article 7 thereof. As Ms Dano was not a worker, self-employed56 or 
following a course of study,57 she had to comply with the criteria contained in Article 7(1)(b) of 
                                                          
49 See, C. O’Brien, “Civis Capitalis Sum: Class as the New Guiding Principle of EU Free Movement Rights”, 53 
CMLRev. (2016), p. 945.  
50 Ibid. 
51 G. Davies, “Migrant Union Citizens and Social Assistance: Trying to Be Reasonable About Self-Sufficiency”, 
College of Europe, Research Paper in Law 02/2016, p. 12. 
52 Case C-333/13, Dano, EU:C:2014:2358, paras. 35, 36. 
53 Ibid., para. 64.  
54 Ibid., para. 61. 
55 Ibid., para. 68. 
56 Article 7(1)(a) of the Citizenship Directive. 
57 Article 7(1)(c) of the Citizenship Directive. 
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the Citizenship Directive, which requires sufficient resources and comprehensive sickness 
insurance cover.58 The ECJ held that “according to the findings of the referring court the 
applicants do not have sufficient resources and thus cannot claim a right of residence in the 
host Member State under Directive 2004/38”.59 Consequently, the applicants could not rely on 
the right to equal treatment provided for in Article 24(1) of the Citizenship Directive. The Court 
concluded that Article 24(1) of the Citizenship Directive, read in conjunction with Article 7(1) 
thereof, did not preclude national legislation such as that which excluded the applicants from 
access to these benefits.60   
Notably, the ECJ did not mention the principle of proportionality and because of this, the ECJ 
also abstained from assessing the facts of the individual case and balancing the competing 
interests. This development is remarkable, given that Ms Dano had lived in Germany for 
several years, where she gave birth to her son in 2009 and given that her sister materially 
provided for her and her son by accommodating them in her apartment.61 In the subsequent 
Alimanovic case, the ECJ provided reasons as to why it abstained from undertaking a 
proportionality test. 
 
b. The Alimanovic Case 
Nazifa Alimanovic and her three children are Swedish citizens.62 In contrast to Ms Dano, Ms 
Alimanovic and her oldest daughter had been economically active in the host Member State 
(Germany) before claiming subsistence allowances for the long-term unemployed as well as 
social allowance for her two minor children. According to the referring court, the benefits 
claimed were ‘special non-contributory cash benefits’ within the meaning of Article 70(2) of 
Regulation No 883/2004.63 The ECJ stated that it “is apparent from the Court’s case-law, such 
benefits are also covered by the concept of ‘social assistance’ within the meaning of Article 
24(2) of Directive 2004/38”.64  
Ms. Alimanovic, and her oldest daughter, worked for eleven months in Germany. Had 
they worked for twelve months, they would have retained their status as workers pursuant to 
Article 7(3)(b) of the Citizenship Directive. Lacking one month of employment, the ECJ relied 
on Article 7(3)(c) of the Citizenship Directive and noted that Ms Alimanovic and her daughter 
                                                          
58 Article 7(1)(b) of the Citizenship Directive. 
59 Case C-333/13, Dano, EU:C:2014:2358, para. 81. 
60 Ibid., paras. 82, 83. 
61 Ibid., para. 37. 
62 Case C-67/14, Alimanovic, EU:C:2015:597, para. 25. 
63 Ibid., para. 43. 
64 Ibid., para. 44. 
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retained worker status for at least six months after their last employment had ended.65 Given 
that this period had expired, they were barred from claiming unemployment benefits and could 
only apply for long-term unemployed benefits.  
 Regarding the question of whether the refusal of these benefits was compliant with EU 
law, the Court held that it must be determined “‘whether the principle of equal treatment 
referred to in Article 24(1) (…) is applicable and, accordingly, whether the Union citizen 
concerned is lawfully resident on the territory of the host Member State”.66 Since the six month 
period referred to in Article 7(3)(c) of the Citizenship Directive had expired in the case of Ms. 
Alimanovic and her daughter, the second provision, Article 14(4)(b) of the Citizenship Directive, 
was decisive. Article 14(4)(b) of the Citizenship Directive provides that a Union citizen who 
entered the territory of the host Member State in order to seek employment there may not be 
expelled for as long as (s)he can provide evidence that (s)he is continuing to seek employment 
and has a genuine chance of becoming economically engaged.67 Despite the fact that EU 
citizens who can rely on Article 14(4)(b) of the Citizenship Directive have a residence right on 
the basis of the aforementioned Directive and could therefore, in principle, rely on Article 24(1) 
of the Citizenship Directive, Article 24(2) of the Citizenship Directive contains derogations to 
Article 24(1). Accordingly, the Court ruled that Article 24(2) of the Citizenship Directive can be 
invoked “in order not to grant that citizen the social assistance sought” given that Article 24(2) 
of the Citizenship Directive explicitly refers to Article 14(4)(b) of the Citizenship Directive.68 The 
Court concluded that Union law does not preclude national legislation which excludes EU 
citizens covered by Article 14(4)(b) of the Citizenship Directive from “entitlement to certain 
‘special non-contributory cash benefits’ (…) although those benefits are granted to nationals 
of the Member State concerned who are in the same situation”.69 
 
aa. The principle of proportionality  
The principle of proportionality is a pillar of the Rechtsstaat and a general principle of 
EU law70 that is codified in Article 5(4) TEU and contained in Protocol (No. 2) on the application 
of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Under the principle of proportionality a 
measure must be “suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues”.71 
                                                          
65 Ibid., paras. 53-55. 
66 Ibid., para. 51. 
67 Article 14(4)(b) of the Citizenship Directive codified the criterion that was established in Case C-292/89, Anto-
nissen, EU:C:1991:80, para. 21.  
68 Case C-67/14, Alimanovic, EU:C:2015:597, para. 57. 
69 Ibid., para. 63. 
70 Case C-273/97, Sirdar, EU:C:1999:523, para. 26; Case C-343/09, Afton Chemicals Limited, EU:C:2010:419, 
para. 45; P. Craig, EU Administrative Law, 2nd edn., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 591. 
71 Case C-55/94, Gebhard, EU:C:1995:411, para. 37; Case C-100/01, Oteiza Olazabal, EU:C:2002:712, para. 43. 
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Moreover, the Court has ruled that the measure must be necessary, which means that it must 
not go beyond what is required in order to attain the objective72 or that no alternative, equally 
effective but less intrusive, measure is available – known as the so-called ‘least onerous means 
test’.73 The principle of proportionality regulates the exercise of the European Union’s power 
and aims at preventing the imposition of an unduly burden on the addressee of a legislative, 
executive or judicial act or decisions and at striking a fair balance between competing interests.   
While the Court previously required a proportionality test in the context of the 
Citizenship Directive, it explicitly abstained from conducting a proportionality assessment in 
Alimanovic and allowed for an automatic exclusion to benefits for jobseekers, if they do not 
retain the status of a worker according to Article 7(3) of the Citizenship Directive. The Court 
acknowledged that it previously ruled that “Directive 2004/38 requires a Member State to take 
account of the individual situation of the person concerned before it adopts an expulsion 
measure or finds that the residence of that person is placing an unreasonable burden on its 
social assistance system”, but held in Alimanovic that no such individual assessment was 
necessary.74  
The explanation provided by the ECJ as to why an individual assessment was not 
necessary relies on several arguments. First, the Court held that “Directive 2004/38, 
establishing a gradual system as regards the retention of the status of ‘worker’ which seeks to 
safeguard the right of residence and access to social assistance, itself takes into consideration 
various factors characterising the individual situation of each applicant for social assistance 
and, in particular, the duration of the exercise of any economic activity”.75  In the next 
paragraph, the Court argued that: “By enabling those concerned to know, without any 
ambiguity, what their rights and obligations are, the criterion referred to (…)  in Article 7(3)(c) 
of Directive 2004/38, namely a period of six months after the cessation of employment during 
which the right to social assistance is retained, is consequently such as to guarantee a 
significant level of legal certainty and transparency in the context of the award of social 
assistance by way of basic provision, while complying with the principle of proportionality”.76 
These arguments will be analysed respectively, starting with the last argument that 
Article 7(3) of the Citizenship Directive 2004/38 complies with the principle of proportionality. 
Given that the principle of proportionality is a general principle of Union law and given that it 
                                                          
72 Ibid. 
73 M. Franzen, in: R. Streinz (ed.), EUV/AEUV Kommentar, 2nd edn., C.H. Beck, 2012, Art. 45, para. 127. 
74 Case C-67/14, Alimanovic, EU:C:2015:597, para. 59. 
75 Ibid., para. 60. 
76 Ibid., para. 61. 
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underpins the Citizenship Directive, as its Preamble and several of its Articles refer to this 
principle;77 the Citizenship Directive must therefore comply with the principle of proportionality.  
The argument that the Citizenship Directive, in particular Article 7 thereof “itself takes 
into consideration various factors characterising the individual situation of each applicant for 
social assistance and, in particular, the duration of the exercise of any economic activity”78 is 
startling. Provisions in laws or directives are usually phrased in abstract and general terms in 
order to cover a variety of situations and a plurality of individuals. The application of the 
provision to the facts of the individual case, for example by way of an administrative act, is 
concrete and individual. It is difficult to see how an abstract and general provision can at the 
same time be concrete and individual.79 
The final argument advanced by the Court as to why a proportionality assessment was 
not necessary, was based on legal certainty. The Court held that Article 7(3)(c) of Directive 
2004/38 guarantees “a significant level of legal certainty and transparency” by “enabling those 
concerned to know, without any ambiguity, what their rights and obligations are”.80  
bb. The principle of legal certainty  
Another cornerstone of the Rechtsstaat is the principle of legal certainty. In Westzucker 
the Court referred to the principle of legal certainty as a principle “by which the confidence of 
persons concerned deserves to be protected (Vertrauensschutz)”.81 This principle comprises 
the protection of legitimate expectations82 and non-retroactivity.83 The Court’s finding that 
Article 7(3)(c) of Directive 2004/38 guarantees “a significant level of legal certainty and 
transparency” by “enabling those concerned to know, without any ambiguity, what their rights 
and obligations are”84 is not entirely clear.  
The first and most obvious option is that the ECJ refers to the applicants for the benefits, 
namely Ms Alimanovic and her daughter. But would Ms Alimanovic’s and her daughter’s legal 
certainty be impaired if a proportionality assessment was conducted? If the default position is 
that Ms Alimanovic is not entitled to the benefit, her legal certainty would not be negatively 
                                                          
77 See for example Recital 23 of the Preamble to the Citizenship Directive and Article 27(2) of the Citizenship 
Directive.  
78 Case C-67/14, Alimanovic, EU:C:2015:597, para. 60. 
79 See also, N. Nic Shuibne, “What I tell you three times is true: lawful residence and equal treatment after 
Dano”, 23 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2016), pp. 922, 923; A. Iliopoulou-Penot (Fn. 
11), p. 1024. 
80 Case C-67/14, Alimanovic, EU:C:2015:597, para. 61. 
81 Case C-1/73, Westzucker, EU:C:1973:78, para. 6. 
82 See, Case C-2/75, Mackprang, EU:C:1975:66, para. 44. 
83 It does, however, not exclude all possibility of retroactive effect, Case C-88/76, Société pour l'exportation des 
sucres SA, EU:C:1977:61, para. 17. 
84 Case C-67/14, Alimanovic, EU:C:2015:597, para. 61. 
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affected by a balancing process. The balancing process could lead to the conclusion that she 
is entitled to the benefit due to her links with the host Member State (Germany). This ‘additional 
test’ might impinge upon the certainty that she is not entitled to receive the benefit, but it would 
not undermine her trust in the (host) Member State. 
The Court’s reference to ‘those concerned’ could also hint at the respective Member 
State, which would be obliged to pay the benefit to the applicant. The Member State’s certainty 
would be affected if its obligation to pay the benefit was dependent on the outcome of a 
balancing process. But legal certainty traditionally refers to the trust of the individual in the 
continuity of the law and to the individual’s legitimate expectations.85 Van Meerbeeck rightly 
remarks that “legal certainty should operate mainly for the benefit of the individual”.86  
Finally, the notion ‘those concerned’ could refer to the nationals of the host Member 
State, who might indirectly be obliged to pay the benefit, for example through their tax 
contributions. This outright exclusion of EU citizens who do not fulfil certain requirements 
signals to the nationals of the host Member State that they are no longer expected to show a 
certain degree of financial solidarity with EU citizens from other Member States.  
 
cc. The friction between legal certainty and the principle of proportionality 
Legal certainty and transparency on the one hand and the principle of proportionality 
on the other are not always reconcilable. Nic Shuibhne rightly points out that a “framework that 
requires a case-by-case assessments is far from perfect, especially from the perspectives of 
legal certainty and workability in practice”.87 Verschueren has criticised the Court’s previous 
“unreasonable burden assessment” for increasing legal uncertainty and confusion.88 Similarly, 
Spaventa points out, with reference to Förster89 and O. & B.,90 that “the case by case 
assessment – unworkable for either Court or administrators – is discarded in favour of more 
predictable rights for economically inactive people”.91  
A case-by-case assessment is indeed a source of insecurity. A casuistic approach 
makes it not only more difficult for the applicant and his or her lawyer to predict the outcome 
of the case, but it also makes it more difficult for national courts to bring their judgments in line 
                                                          
85 Grzeszick, in: Maunz/Dürig, Grundgesetz-Kommentar, Art. 20, para. 69 (78. EGL Sept. 2016).  
86 J. Van Meerbeeck, “The principle of legal certainty in the case-law of the European Court of Justice: from cer-
tainty to trust”, 40 E.L. Rev. (2016), p. 276. 
87 N. Nic Shuibhne (Fn. 2), p. 913. 
88 H. Verschueren (Fn. 45), p. 169; A. Iliopoulou-Penot (Fn. 11), p. 1026, who argues that the unreasonable bur-
den test did not provide meaningful guidance to national authorities. 
89 Case C-158/07, Förster, EU:C:2008:630. 
90 Case C-456/12, O. & B, EU:C:2014:135. 
91 E. Spaventa (Fn. 2), p. 208. 
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with the ECJ’s case law. Yet, insecurity regarding the outcome of the balancing process is an 
inherent feature of the proportionality principle, which in turn is a fundamental principle of EU 
law. This insecurity has been limited to a certain degree by a codification of the criteria that 
must be taken into consideration throughout the balancing process92 and by refining these 
criteria in the Court’s case law.93 These criteria provide some degree of guidance to the 
executive and judiciary when balancing the conflicting interests. They can be considered a 
compromise between the principle of legal certainty and the principle of proportionality as they 
clarify which considerations play a role in the balancing process and thereby add some degree 
of legal certainty. Legal certainty could be enhanced even further – without jeopardising the 
principle of proportionality – by attaching specific weight to the respective criterion, in other 
words by ranking the different criteria and by identifying criteria that shall have more weight 
than others. Moreover, Nic Shuibhne rightly argues that an individual assessment “does 
mediate the ambiguities built into the Directive”.94 
 
dd. The Court’s approach: a departure from a proportionality test  
The Court’s approach in Alimanovic does not strike any balance between the principle 
of legal certainty and the principle of proportionality. It sacrifices the proportionality assessment 
for the sake of legal certainty.  
First, the provisions of the Citizenship Directive, on which the Court relies, do not bar a 
proportionality assessment. Article 7(3)(c) of the Citizenship Directive, for example, is not 
conclusive, as it establishes a minimum period for which the status of ‘worker’ is retained, but 
does not establish a maximum period after which the status must be revoked. It thereby leaves 
discretion to the national authorities when they are implementing the Directive. This discretion 
must be exercised in line with the principle of proportionality. Similarly, Article 24(2) of the 
Citizenship Directive provides that a “Member State shall not be obliged to confer entitlement 
to social assistance (…)”, but it does not prevent Member States from doing so.  
Secondly, the question of whose legal certainty is enhanced is relevant. Ruling out a 
proportionality assessment in a situation where a proportionality assessment could be 
potentially beneficial for Ms Alimanovic; however where the lack of a proportionality 
assessment would be beneficial for the host Member State, this would in turn arouse the 
                                                          
92 See for example, the criteria listed in Recital 16 of the Preamble to the Citizenship Directive that are used to 
determine whether the individual is an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the host Mem-
ber State.  
93 Case C-140/12, Brey, EU:C:2013:565, paras. 69, 78. 
94 N. Nic Shuibhne (Fn. 2), p. 913. 
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suspicion that legal certainty is being used to mask a decision that gives precedence to the 
interests of one party and sidelining the duty to give reasons.  
Thirdly, a proportionality assessment might be necessitated by the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (hereinafter: CFR or Charter). According to Article 51(1) of the Charter 
the “provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions and bodies of the Union and to 
the Member States only when they are implementing Union law”. The notion of ‘implementing 
Union law’ is open to interpretation. In Åkerberg Fransson, the Court gave this notion a wide 
interpretation by stating that “[t]hat article of the Charter thus confirms the Court’s case-law 
relating to the extent to which actions of the Member States must comply with the requirements 
flowing from the fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union”.95 In 
the next paragraph, the Court stated that “[t]he Court’s settled case-law indeed states, that the 
fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union are applicable in all 
situations governed by European Union law”.96 The notion of “all situations governed by Union 
law” is admittedly wider than the notion of implementation of Union law. Regarding this wider 
interpretation, Tridimas rightly points out that the judgment ensures conformity between the 
scope of application of general principles and the Charter rights.97 According to the Court 
“fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter must therefore be complied with where national 
legislation falls within the scope of European Union law”.98 
The Alimanovic situation even fulfils the narrow interpretation contained in Article 51(1) 
CFR, as the Member State was implementing Union law.  As outlined above, the Court found 
that Ms Alimanovic and her daughter had a right of residence on the basis of Article 14(4)(b) 
of the Citizenship Directive99 which had been transposed into German law.100 By applying this 
provision, the German authorities implemented Union law as per Article 51(1) of the Charter 
and, as a consequence, the German authorities were bound by the Charter. Given that Ms 
Alimanovic gave birth to her three children in Germany and had lived and worked in Germany 
for some time, the denial of the benefit would have to be assessed for its compatibility with the 
right to respect for private and family life (Article 7 of the Charter). This in turn would have 
required an assessment of the facts of the individual case and a proportionality assessment. 
                                                          
95 Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, EU:C:2013:280, para. 18.  
96 Ibid., para. 19. 
97 T. Tridimas, “Fundamental Rights, General Principles of EU Law, and the Charter”, 16 Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies (2014), p. 383. 
98 Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, EU:C:2013:280, para. 21. 
99 Case C-67/14, Alimanovic, EU:C:2015:597, para. 57. See further, S. Mantu and P. Minderhoud, “Exploring the 
limits of social solidarity: welfare tourism and EU citizenship”, 2 UNIO – EU law Journal (2016), p. 18.   
100 §2(2) no 1a Freedom of Movement Act/EU (Gesetz über die allgemeine Freizügigkeit von Unionsbürgern) 
which (then) implemented Article 14(4)(b) of the Citizenship Directive into German law. 
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Moreover, the application of the Charter would have given the Court the chance to elaborate 
on Article 34 of the Charter (regarding social security and social assistance).  
In sum, the relevant provisions of the Citizenship Directive do not bar a proportionality 
assessment. Moreover, the Court’s reference to legal certainty sidelines an explanation as to 
why the interests of the host Member State and its population should outweigh the interests of 
the EU citizen. Finally, an assessment of the facts of the individual case and a proportionality 
assessment would have been required, at the very least, by the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.  
3. Right of residence of third-country family members upon return to the Union citizen’s 
home Member State 
Another example where the Court abstained from an assessment of the facts of the individual 
case and a proportionality assessment was the O & B case.101 O & B concerned the residence 
rights of third-country family members upon their return to the Union citizen’s home Member 
State after having exercised free movement rights. Even though the Court had previously 
addressed return situations in Eind102 and Singh103, the Court’s case law was not codified in 
Directive 2004/38. In March 2014, the CJEU was asked in O. & B. whether the case law 
resulting from Singh and Eind was “capable of being applied generally to family members of 
Union citizens who, having availed themselves of the rights conferred on them by Article 21(1) 
TFEU, resided in a Member State other than that of which they are nationals, before returning 
to the Member State of origin”.104 The reason given in Eind and Singh for not only granting a 
residence right to the third-country family member in the host Member State, but also in the 
home Member State of the Union citizen upon return, was based on the consideration that the 
denial of such a right could discourage Union citizens (in these cases workers) to avail 
themselves of the freedoms granted by the Treaty if they are not able to continue “on returning 
to his Member State of origin, a way of family life which may have come into being in the host 
Member State as a result of marriage or family reunification”.105 Adam and van Elsuwege point 
to a second underlying logic, namely “that family reunification is key to the migrant’s integration 
in the host society”.106 
In O. & B. the Court held that the requirements established by the Citizenship Directive should 
be applied by analogy.107 Here again the Court reversed the hierarchy between primary and 
                                                          
101 Case C-456/12, O. & B., EU:C:2014:135. 
102 Case C-291/05, Eind, EU:C:2007:771. 
103 Case C-370/90, Singh, EU:C:1992:296.  
104 Case C-456/12, O. & B., EU:C:2014:135, para. 48. 
105 See, Case C-291/05, Eind, EU:C:2007:771, para. 35 and 36. 
106 S. Adam and P. van Elsuwege (Fn. 32), p. 449. 
107 Case C-456/12, O. & B., EU:C:2014:135, para. 50. 
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secondary EU law. Sarmiento and Sharpston rightly point out that “the Court chose to interpret 
the Treaty in light of a directive (…) rather than basing itself simply upon a purposive 
interpretation of the Treaty”.108 The Court stated that the EU citizen’s residence in the host 
Member State must have been sufficiently genuine “so as to enable that citizen to create or 
strengthen family life in that Member State”.109 For determining the genuineness of residence, 
the ECJ had recourse to Article 7 of the Citizenship Directive, which specifies the requirements 
for residence exceeding three months. The Court ruled that “[r]esidence in the host Member 
State pursuant to and in conformity with the conditions set out in Article 7(1) of that directive 
is, in principle, evidence of settling there and therefore of the Union citizen’s genuine residence 
in the host Member State and goes hand in hand with creating and strengthening family life in 
that Member State”.110 Residence of up to three months was, by way of contrast, insufficient. 
Similar to the reasoning in Dano and Alimanovic the determinative criteria in O. & B. were 
those contained in Article 7 of the Citizenship Directive. These criteria are certainly conducive 
to legal certainty, even though the Court did not draw upon the principle of legal certainty in O. 
& B. Another common feature of these cases is the Court’s abstention from both an assess-
ment of the facts of the individual case and a balancing process. The requirements established 
in O. & B., a minimum duration of residence in the host Member State of three months and the 
fulfilment of the criteria contained in Article 7 of the Citizenship Directive, do not seem to be 
disproportionate per se. However, it is problematic to abstain from an assessment of the facts 
of the individual case and a balancing process in those situations where the residence falls 
short of the minimum duration of three months and/or the fulfilment of the criteria contained in 
Article 7 of the Citizenship Directive. The automatic exclusion from the possibility to be accom-
panied by a third-country national family member if the criteria of Article 7 of the Citizenship 
Directive are not fulfilled, is difficult to reconcile with the principle of proportionality. Situations 
in which residence in the host Member State is intended to exceed three months, but fails to 
reach this threshold due to compelling reasons,111 can still exhibit facts that might lead to the 
conclusion that the family member of the Union citizen should have a right of residence in the 
Union citizen’s home Member State. Schoenmaekers and Hoogenboom therefore rightly pro-
pose that a period of residence falling short of the three-month criterion must be evaluated on 
                                                          
108 D. Sarmiento and E. Sharpston, “European Union Citizenship and Its New Union: Time to Move On?”, in: D. 
Kochenov (ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism, The Role of Rights, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2017, p. 237. 
109 Case C-456/12, O. & B., EU:C:2014:135, para. 51. 
110 Ibid., para. 53. 
111 For an example see, K. Hamenstädt, “The impact of the duration of lawful residence on the rights of Euro-
pean Union citizens and their third-country family members”, 24 Maastricht Journal of European and Compara-
tive Law (2017), p. 72. 
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its merits.112 Their suggestion is more likely to achieve balanced results as it takes a broader 
range of considerations into account and complies with the principle of proportionality. 
The more recent judgments discussed in the first two parts of this article, have in com-
mon that the Court abstains from a proportionality test and focuses strongly on clear and meas-
urable criteria, which are conducive to legal certainty. Regarding the acquisition of the right of 
permanent residence (5.) and the protection against expulsion (6.), the Court relies on the 
umbrella concept of integration (4.), which will subsequently be addressed. The notion of inte-
gration conveys “a set of normative values” and can be given different meanings.113  It is inde-
terminate and therefore not conducive to legal certainty. 
 
4. The notion of integration 
The notion of integration is an inherently open-ended term which is subject to differing 
interpretations.114 It serves different functions, both in national115 and EU law.116 Two opposing 
interpretations are relevant for placing the case law that will be introduced in the following 
sections, in context.  
One view considers a secure residence status and equal treatment of migrants with 
nationals of the respective state as being conducive for integration.117 The opposite standpoint 
takes the view that a lack of integration on the part of the migrant is a ground for refusing 
admission to the country or rejecting access to certain rights.118 Both perspectives are 
traceable in the ECJ’s case law119 and in EU legislation.120 
                                                          
112 S. Schoenmaekers and A. Hoogenboom, “Singh and Carpenter Revisited: Some Progress but not Final Clarity 
Case C-456/12 O. v. Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel, and Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en 
Asiel v. B., Judgment of 12 March 2014, and Case C-457/12 S v. Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel, 
and Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel v. C., Judgment of 12 March 2014”, 21 Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law (2014), p. 507. 
113 D. Thym, “Towards a Contextual Conception of Social Integration in EU Immigration Law. Comments on P & 
S and K & A”, 18 European Journal of Migration and Law (2016), pp. 106, 107. 
114 Ibid., pp. 106-109; K. Groenendijk, “Legal Concepts of Integration in EU Migration Law”, 6 European Journal 
of Migration and Law (2004), p. 113. 
115 Regarding the notion of integration in national migration law see: J, Eichenhofer, Begriffe und Konzept der 
Integration im Aufenthaltsgesetz, Nomos, 2013. 
116 K. Groenendijk (Fn. 114), p. 113. 
117 K. Groenendijk, “Long-term immigrants and the Council of Europe”, in: E. Guild and P. Minderhoud (eds.), 
Security of Residence and Expulsion, Brill, 2001, p. 7; D. Acosta, The Long-Term Resident Status as a Subsidiary 
Form of EU Citizenship, An Analysis of Directive 2003/109, Brill, 2011, p. 138 (regarding long-term resident 
third-country nationals). 
118 For further information regarding both perspectives see: D. Thym (Fn. 113), pp. 106, 107. 
119 Case C-389/87, Echternach, EU:C:1989:130, para. 20 (representing the perspective that a secure residence 
status and equal treatment with nationals is conducive to integration); Case C-325/09, Dias, EU:C:2011:498, 
para. 64 (integration as a requirement). 
120 See K. Groenendijk (Fn. 114), p. 114. In this article Groenendijk assesses three selected legal instruments. 
19 
 
In contrast to third-country nationals, who can be subject to integration requirements, 
for example before acquiring the long-term resident status,121 integration requirements cannot 
be imposed on EU citizens.122 In 2004, Groenendijk rightly noted that “under the current rules 
on free movement, in the Directive there is no integration requirement whatsoever”.123 He 
states that a lack of integration as a ground for refusing admission or certain rights is “absent 
with respect to Union citizens and their family members”.124  
The recourse to and interpretation of the notion of integration seems to be part of a 
more general shift in the case law on EU citizenship. As noted by Thym,125 there has been a 
shift in the interpretation of the objectives of the Citizenship Directive. In its Metock judgment 
of 2008, the Court still held that “Directive 2004/38 aims to facilitate the exercise of the primary 
and individual right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States that is 
conferred directly on Union citizens by the Treaty”.126  In Dano, by way of contrast, the Court 
adopted a different stance. Even though the Court did not refer to the directive as a whole, it 
was held that “Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 2004/38 seeks to prevent economically inactive Union 
citizens from using the host Member State’s welfare system to fund their means of 
subsistence”.127 This shift in the interpretation of the Directive’s objective is also reflected in 
the Court’s interpretation of the notion of integration used in the Directive.  
The Directive adheres to the first interpretation of the notion of integration, which 
considers a secure residence status conducive for the integration of the Union citizen in the 
host society. This is demonstrated by Recital 18 of the Preamble to the Citizenship Directive, 
which addresses the right of permanent residence and provides: “In order to be a genuine 
vehicle for integration into the society of the host Member State in which the Union citizen 
resides, the right of permanent residence, once obtained, should not be subject to any 
conditions”. Permanent residence is consequently considered a vehicle for integration and is 
not a prerequisite for the acquisition of permanent residence.  
The Court, by way of contrast, adopted an interpretation of the notion of integration, 
which considers integration to be a prerequisite and that the lack of integration can be a reason 
for refusing protection against expulsion or the acquisition of the right of permanent residence. 
 
                                                          
121 Article 5(2) of Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-
term residents, O.J. L 16, 23.01.2004, pp. 44. 
122 D. Thym, “Freizügigkeit in Europa als Modell?”, EuR 2011, pp. 489.  
123 K. Groenendijk (Fn. 114), p. 125. 
124 Ibid. 
125 D. Thym (Fn. 14), pp. 254, 255. 
126 Case C-127/08, Metock, EU:C:2008:449, para. 82. 
127 Case C-333/13, Dano, EU:C:2014:2358, para. 76. 
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5. Right to permanent residence 
The requirements for acquiring the right of permanent residence are stipulated in Article 16 of 
the Citizenship Directive, which provides that “Union citizens who have resided legally for a 
continuous period of five years in the host Member State shall have the right of permanent 
residence there”. Article 16(2) thereof extends this right to the family members of EU citizens. 
Already in Dias (2011), the Court hinted at an integration objective which lies behind 
the acquisition of the right of permanent residence. It held that “Article 16(1) of Directive 
2004/38 is based not only on territorial and time factors but also on qualitative elements, 
relating to the level of integration in the host Member State”.128   
The Court adopted the same approach in Onuekwere, which concerned the acquisition 
of the right of permanent residence by a third-country family member of a Union citizen. The 
Court, in that case, had to address the question of whether time spent in prison could be taken 
into account for the calculation of the five-year period. The Court ultimately answered that 
question in the negative. Moreover, it stated that the continuity of residence was interrupted by 
the prison term.129 In reaching those conclusions, the Court held that “the right of permanent 
residence is a key element in promoting social cohesion and was provided for by that directive 
in order to strengthen the feeling of Union citizenship”.130 Furthermore it ruled that “[t]he EU 
legislature accordingly made the acquisition of the right of permanent residence (…) subject 
to the integration of the citizen of the Union in the host Member State”.131 A few paragraphs 
later, the Court referred to the “the integration requirement which is a precondition of the 
acquisition of the right of permanent residence”.132 Thym rightly observes that there is a 
“conceptual shift away from equal rights as a means for integration, towards an output-oriented 
assessment that links citizens’ rights to the degree of integration”.133 
Even though permanent residence requires lawful and continuous residence and which 
may therefore support the argument that imprisonment interrupts the period of lawful 
residence, Coutts rightly points out that it does not seem that the time spent in prison or 
imprisonment were decisive for the Court.134 Indeed, the ECJ refers to the lack of integration 
                                                          
128 Case C-325/09, Dias, EU:C:2011:498, para. 64. 
129 Case C-378/12, Onuekwere, EU:C:2014:13. For comments on the case see S. Coutts, “Union citizenship as 
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130 Case C-378/12 Onuekwere, EU:C:2014:13, para. 24. 
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which is demonstrated by the rejection of or “non-compliance by the person concerned with 
the values expressed by the society of the host Member State in its criminal law”.135   
An approach that frames the requirement of lawful and continuous residence in the 
language of integration - whereby integration is understood as compliance with societal norms 
and values – does not take other forms of integration (such as economic and labour market 
integration, acquisition of language skills, family ties and the forging of personal ties) into 
account. Such an approach therefore falls short of a comprehensive assessment of the facts 
of the individual case. Moreover, the Court assigns the notion of integration a function that 
differs from the function that the Preamble to the Citizenship Directive assigns to this notion. 
While the Preamble considers a secure residence status conducive for the migrant’s 
integration, the Court considers integration a condition for the acquisition of permanent 
residence and not an aim which is to be achieved by granting the individual the right to 
permanent residence. This development is not only problematic against the background of the 
rights of EU citizens and their third-country family members; the Court’s statement that “the 
integration requirement (…) is a precondition of the acquisition of the right of permanent 
residence”136 is also problematic regarding the principle of legal certainty, as the notion of 
integration is not mentioned in Article 16 of the Citizenship Directive. 
 
6. Protection against expulsion 
The Court’s approach to the protection against expulsion follows a similar pattern as the case 
law on the acquisition of the right of permanent residence insofar as the Court also has 
recourse to the notion of integration. The ECJ’s case law concerning the limitations of free 
movement rights on grounds of public policy, public security and public health has been 
partially codified in the Citizenship Directive, mainly in Articles 27 and 28 thereof. Article 27 of 
the Citizenship Directive, which is entitled ‘general principles’, refers to the principle of 
proportionality, the prohibition of invoking public policy or security on economic grounds and 
the prohibition of basing an expulsion decision on considerations of general prevention, hence 
the deterrence of other foreigners. Article 28 of the Citizenship Directive, which is entitled 
‘protection against expulsion’ refers in its first paragraph to a non-exhaustive list of 
considerations that must be taken into account when conducting a balancing process between 
the competing interests and before an expulsion decision can be adopted. Article 28(2) and 
(3) of the Citizenship Directive provide for an incremental framework of protection against 
expulsion. Article 28(2) of the Citizenship Directive provides that an EU citizen or third-country 
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national family member, who has the right of permanent residence, which is usually acquired 
after five years,137 can only be expelled on serious grounds of public policy or public security. 
The highest level of protection against expulsion is enjoyed by EU citizens138 who have resided 
on the territory of the host Member State for more than ten years139 and by minor EU citizens.140 
These two groups of EU citizens can only be expelled on imperative grounds of public security. 
As outlined above, the Court has already reduced the protection against expulsion for EU 
citizens who are covered by this highest level of protection, by expanding the definition of 
public security in Tsakouridis and P.I. respectively.  
In the M.G.141 judgment of January 2014, the Court undermined the protection against 
expulsion even further by having recourse to the concept of integration. M.G. was a Portuguese 
national resident in the UK who was convicted and sentenced to a 21-months prison term.142 
The Secretary of State ordered her to be deported on grounds of public policy and public 
security. The referring English court asked the ECJ how the ten-year period contained in Article 
28(3)(a) of the Citizenship Directive was to be calculated, namely whether the period spent in 
prison interrupted the period of residence, and whether it makes a difference that the Union 
citizen accrued ten years of residence prior to their imprisonment.143 
When addressing the question of whether the period of imprisonment is capable of 
interrupting the continuity of residence, the Court pointed out that the protection against 
expulsion in the Citizenship Directive was “based on the degree of integration of the persons 
concerned in the host Member State”.144 It held that the “degree of integration (…) is a vital 
consideration underpinning both the right of permanent residence and the system of protection 
against expulsion”.145 It is highly problematic to link the protection against expulsion to the 
individual’s integration in the host Member State.  
Firstly, taking a textual approach, it stands out that, apart from the Preamble to  the 
Citizenship Directive, the notion of integration is only mentioned in Article 28(1) thereof. Article 
28(1) of the Citizenship Directive contains a non-exhaustive list of criteria that have to be taken 
into consideration before an expulsion decision on grounds of public policy or public security 
can be taken and “contains a short summary of the Strasbourg case-law”.146 The EU citizen’s 
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integration in the host Member State is one of these considerations and can bar the expulsion 
of EU citizens,147 but it is not a requirement that must be fulfilled in order to rely on the 
protection against expulsion.  
Secondly, the notion of integration is inherently vague and open to interpretation. With 
regard to Onuekwere, which was addressed above, Nic Shuibhne points out that the judgment 
is not “about a duty to integrate per se”, but about a duty to integrate properly.148 Similarly 
Coutts holds that the Court and the Advocate General are concerned with the “rejection and 
repudiation of the values of society that breaks and undoes or even reveals a complete 
absence of integration on the part of the individual concerned”.149 Linking the protection against 
expulsion to the individual’s integration, in particular if it is conceived as a “duty to integrate 
properly”150 defeats the very purpose of the protection against expulsion. Union citizens who 
are subject to an expulsion decision because they are considered a threat to public policy or 
public security due to a criminal conviction, are not usually considered to be ‘properly’ 
integrated within the host society, especially if integration is understood as compliance “with 
the values expressed by the society of the host Member State in its criminal law”.151 
Thirdly, as is discussed elsewhere,152 Recital 23 of the Preamble to the Citizenship Directive 
provides that measures taken on grounds of public policy or public security “can seriously harm 
persons who, (…) have become genuinely integrated into the host Member State”. This 
sentence demonstrates that genuine integration and posing a threat to public policy or public 
security are not mutually exclusive. An EU citizen who commits a crime in the host Member 
State and is therefore subject to expulsion can still at the same time be societally integrated. 
If, however, integration is understood in terms of “proper integration” and a criminal conviction 
is synonymous with a lack of integration, then a foreigner who is subject to an expulsion 
decision can never be regarded as integrated.   
Linking the protection against expulsion not only to the duration of residence, but to the 
fulfilment of an integration requirement, increases the discretion of the Member State to expel 
EU citizens and thereby undermines the latter’s protection.  
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II. Concluding remarks 
The Court’s case law in these four selected areas can roughly be divided into two categories. 
The first category comprises the second part of this article, that is the case law on EU citizens’ 
access to non-contributory cash benefits and the third part, that is the right of residence of 
third-country family members upon return to the EU citizen’s home Member State. In these two 
parts, the Court relies on the provisions of the Citizenship Directive, either directly or by 
analogy, but abstains from an assessment of the facts of the individual case and from 
conducting a balancing process. In Alimanovic the Court justified its abstention from a 
proportionality assessment by purportedly strengthening legal certainty. Indeed, the 
perspicuous and measurable criteria, in particular, of Article 7 of the Citizenship Directive are 
conducive to legal certainty. A proportionality assessment, by way of contrast, does not aid 
legal certainty, as the outcome of the balancing process between the conflicting interests 
cannot be easily predicted. The principle of proportionality, however, is a general principle of 
Union law and underlies the Citizenship Directive. Several arguments have been advanced as 
to why the reference to legal certainty is unconvincing in the given case and why a 
proportionality assessment is necessary. The Court’s recourse to legal certainty and its 
abstention from a proportionality assessment respectively, has resulted in an increased margin 
of discretion for the Member States to refuse non-contributory cash benefits to EU citizens and 
to deny a right of residence to the third-country family members of Union citizens. It has thereby 
weakened the legal position of Union citizens. 
The second category of the Court’s case law is characterised by the judgments 
regarding the acquisition of permanent residence and the protection against expulsion. In 
contrast to the first category, these judgments do not seem to be guided by strengthening legal 
certainty. Quite the opposite is visible, as the Court has recourse to the indefinite and open-
ended notion of integration. Despite the fact that the Preamble to the Citizenship Directive 
considers integration of Union citizens in the host Member State as an aim to be achieved by 
the ‘instrument’ of a permanent residence status,153 the Court linked the protection against 
expulsion and the acquisition of permanent residence to the integration of the EU citizen and 
effectively turned it into a condition that must be fulfilled. The notion of integration is mentioned 
in the legally binding text of the Directive only in the context of expulsion,154 not as a 
requirement, but as a consideration that may form a bar to an expulsion. By having recourse 
to the notion of integration, both with regard to the protection against expulsion and the right 
of permanent residence, and by imposing it as a requirement the EU citizen must fulfil, the 
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Court not only undermines legal certainty, but it also weakens the position of EU citizens and 
increases the discretion of Member States.  
The Court’s implicit or explicit recourse to the principle of legal certainty in the first category of 
cases and its recourse to the notion of integration in the second category of cases creates a 
situation where EU citizenship, or the rights and protections attached thereto, are not fully 
available for EU citizens who are economically inactive or not sufficiently active or those whom 
infringe the laws of the host member State. Either EU citizenship cannot be considered a 
fundamental status or it can be considered a fundamental status, but only for those EU citizens 
who have the privilege of having sufficient resources and do not happen to fall foul of the law. 
This development further heightens the exclusion and marginalisation of those EU citizens who 
are not covered by the fundamental status or do not have full access to the rights linked thereto, 
which in turn challenges the attainment of the objectives of European integration. The task of 
finding a solution to these challenges is something which must be performed not only by the 
Court, but by other institutions and the European society as a whole. 
 
